Title

Deception in Experiments: Towards Guidelines on Use in Applied Economics Research

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-4-2015

Abstract

Many applied economics journals ban the use of deception in experiments, which contrasts with the policies in other academic disciplines. We examine the cases for and against deception, and describe the ways deception can be employed in applied economics experiments. We create a general ranking of harms from deception in experiments and present evidence from a survey (conducted in summer 2014) of agricultural and applied economists eliciting attitudes towards ten different deceptive practices. Survey respondents view inflicting physical or psychological harm on participants and not making promised payments as the most severe forms of deception. Less severe forms of deception include providing participants with incomplete product information and conducting an experiment using participants who are not aware they are part of an experiment. Finally, we provide recommendations for policies addressing deception in experiments.

Journal

Applied Economics Perspectives and Policy

Volume

37

Issue

3

First Page

524

Last Page

536